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Abstract— In this paper, we address the problem of modeling
the traffic flow of a heritage city whose streets are represented
by a network. We consider a mean field approach where the
standard forward backward system of equations is also inter-
twined with a path preferences dynamics. The path preferences
are influenced by the congestion status on the whole network
as well as the possible hassle of being forced to run during the
tour. We prove the existence of a mean field equilibrium as a
fixed point, over a suitable set of time-varying distributions,
of a map obtained as a limit of a sequence of approximating
functions. Then, a bi-level optimization problem is formulated
for an external controller who aims to induce a specific mean
field equilibrium.
Index Terms— Traffic flow optimal control; mean field games;
path preference dynamics; dynamical flow networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent years, the continuous growth of traffic flow
and the resulting overcrowding have led some cities to seek
solutions to manage this phenomenon. The crowd motion
modeling and the study of flow dynamics have become in
the last decades two of the main targets of the transportation
research community. Different modeling approaches have
been proposed which can generally be classified into two
categories: microscopic models and macroscopic models.
The former include the cellular automaton model, the social
force model, and the lattice gas model (see e.g., [1]–[3]), and
are particularly well suited for use with small crowds. Macro-
scopic models, in contrast, focus on the overall behavior of
pedestrian flows and are more applicable to investigations of
extremely large crowds, especially when examining aspects
of motion in which individual differences are less important
[4]–[6]. In this paper, starting from the results in [7]–[8],
we introduce a Mean Field (MF) approach to modeling and
analytically studying the flow of daily agents along the street
of a heritage city. Mean field games (MFG) theory goes back
to the seminal work by Lasry-Lions [9] (see also [10]). This
theory includes methods and techniques to study differential
games with a large population of rational players and it
is based on the assumption that the population influences
individuals’ strategies through mean field parameters. Several
application domains such as economic, physics, biology and
network engineering accommodate MFG theoretical models
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(see [11]–[13]). In particular, models to study of dynamics
on networks and/or pedestrian movement can be found for
example in [14]–[16]. In this paper, beside the usual framing
of mean field games (which is typically defined by the pair
made of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and transport equations),
we consider the agent’s path preferences dynamics. In par-
ticular, we assume that it evolves following a perturbed
best response to global information about the congestion
status of the whole network and to the control vector.
Moreover, this path preferences dynamics evolves at a slow
time scale as compared to the physical dynamics. We apply
these arguments to the possible paths considering a network
topology as in Figure 1.
Our main result shows the existence of a MF equilib-
rium for our framework. This equilibrium is a time-varying
distribution of agents, ρ˜(t) for t ∈ [0, T ], on the network.
Distribution ρ˜(t), when plugged in the cost to minimize,
generates an optimal control u˜(t), for any agent starting at
the origin o which, in turn, yields the path preference z(t)
providing the time-varying distribution ρ˜. We also introduce
a possible bi-level optimization problem for an external
controller who aims to force the equilibrium to be as close
as possible (in uniform topology) to a reference value ρ˜.
We suppose that the external controller (the city hall, for
example) may act on the congestion functions choosing them
among a suitable set of admissible functions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we describe the model and state the hypotheses used in
the paper. In Section III, we claim the existence of a MF
equilibrium (due to the space limitation, we only include
the sketches of the proofs) and, in Section IV, we define
a bi-level optimization problem. In Section V, we draw
conclusions and suggests future works.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
A. Network characteristics
We model the topology of the network as a directed multi-
graph G = (V, E), where V is a finite set of nodes and E is
a finite set of directed links. Each link e = (νe, κe) in E is
directed from its tail node νe to its head node κe 6= νe. An
oriented path from a node v0 to a node vr is an ordered set
of r adjacent links p = (e1, e2, . . . , er) such that νe1 = v0,
κer = vr, vs = κes = νes+1 for 1 ≤ s ≤ r− 1, and no node
is visited twice, i.e., vl 6= vs for all 0 ≤ l < s ≤ r, except
possibly for v0 = vr, in which case the path is referred to
as a cycle. Moreover, let `e be the length of the link e ∈ E
and let `p =
∑
e∈p `e be the length of the path p. A node vj
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is said to be reachable from another node vk if there exists
at least a path from vk to vj .
We hold the following assumptions on the multi-graph G
and on the agents that move along its links.
Assumption 1:
1) G contains no cycles.
2) G includes an origin node o, from which any node in
V can be reached, and a destination node d 6= o, which
is reachable from any node in V , o included.
3) Agents arrive at o in the morning and desire to leave
from d in the afternoon.
We denote Γ as the set of all the paths from o to d.
In particular, in this paper, we consider a graph G on
which agents have only three possible paths to reach the
destination d starting from the origin o (see Figure 1). In this
Fig. 1. The graph topology used in the paper.
case, the set of path is Γ = {p1, p2, p3}, where p1 = (e1, e4),
p2 = (e2, e5), p3 = (e1, e3, e5). We denote the correspond-
ing link-path incidence matrix by A ∈ {0, 1}|E|×|Γ| with
entries
Aep =
{
1 if e ∈ p,
0 otherwise.
For every link e ∈ E and time instant t ∈ [0, T ], we denote
the current mass and flow by ρe(t) and fe(t), respectively,
defined as
ρe : [0, T ]→ [0, ρmax], fe : [0, T ]→ [0, Ce],
with T > 0 the final horizon, i.e., the time by which every
agent has to reach the destination d, and Ce is the maximum
flow capacity. Moreover let
ρ(t) := {ρe(t) : e ∈ E}, f(t) := {fe(t) : e ∈ E} (1)
be the vectors of masses and flows, respectively.
B. Agents’ dynamics and costs{
θ˙e(s) = u
e(s), s ∈]t, T ], ∀e ∈ E ,
θe(t) = 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], ∀e ∈ E ,
(2)
where θe(s) ∈ [0, `e], being `e the length of the link. Using
this space-coordinates, θe(s) = 0 means that the agent is in
νe, while θe(s) = `e means that the agent is in κe and hence
he is inside the link e as long as 0 ≤ θ(s) ≤ `e. Note that
(2) describes the evolution of a possible agent which is in νe
at time t independently of the fact that he is present at νe at
that time. By definition, θe(s) and ue(s) are equal to NaN
when the agent is not on link e. Hereinafter, NaN stands
for not a number.
The control, s 7→ ue(s) ∈ R+, is measurable and locally
integrable, namely ue ∈ L1loc(t, T ) ∀t. For ease of notation,
from now on, we call Ue the set of these kind of controls.
There is no loss of optimality in assuming ue ≥ 0 as we
discuss later in Remark 1. The cost to be minimized by every
agent crossing a link e, takes into account: i) the possible
hassle of running in the link e to reach d on time; ii) the
pain of being entrapped in highly congested link; iii) the
disappointment of not being able to reach d by the final
horizon T . Such a cost can be analytically represented by
Je(t, u
e) =
∫ T
t
χ{0≤θe(s)≤`e}
(
(ue(s))2
2
+ ϕe(ρe(s))
)
ds
+χ{0≤θe(T )<`e}α
∑
j∈p(e)
`j , (3)
where p(e) is the shortest path from νe to d, α > 0 is a
constant parameter representing a cost per unit of length
and χ is the characteristic function. In (3), the quadratic
term inside the integral stands for cost i) while the other
term stands for the congestion cost ii) given by the function
ϕe : [0, ρmax]→ [0,+∞[; the last addendum stands for cost
iii).
We define, with a little abuse of terminology, as value
functions the following:
V e(t) = inf
ue∈Ue
{
Je(t, u
e)
+ min
j∈E:νj=κe
e,j∈p, p∈Γ
{V j(τ(t, ue))}
}
∀ e ∈ E (4)
V 0(t) = min
e∈E:νe=o
e∈p, p∈Γ
{V e(t)}. (5)
In (4), τ(t, ue) is the time at which an agent entering link
e at time t and choosing a control ue arrives in νj = κe.
Note that the recursive definition of V e in (4) is not mean-
ingless since the absence of oriented cycles in the network G
prevents self-referring, that is it cannot occur that we define
V e in terms of itself. Also V 0 can be seen as associated to a
fictitious link e0 with null length, such that νe0 = κe0 = o,
through which the flow enters into the network. Finally,
observe that when the distributional evolution t → ρe(t),
i.e. the mass of the agents on the link e, is initially given
then V e does not depend on ρe.
In this paper, we assume that the physical traffic flow f
consist of indistinguishable homogeneous agents which enter
in the network through the origin node, travel through it on
the different paths and finally exit from the network through
the destination node. The relative appeal of the different
paths to the agents is modelled by a time-varying nonnegative
vector z(t) in the simplex
Sλ(t) =
{
z ∈ R|Γ|+ : 1′z(t) = λ(t)
}
, (6)
where λ(t) : [0, T ] → [0, ρmax] is the throughput, i.e., the
total flow that goes through the network. We refer to the
vector z(t) as the current aggregate path preference and let
yz(t) = Az(t) (7)
be the flow vector associated to it. The vector z(t) is
updated as agents access global information about the current
congestion status of the whole network (that is embodied by
the mass vector ρ(t)) and it is also influenced by the vector
u(t) = {ue(t) 6= NaN : e ∈ E}. Hereinafter, U is the set of
these vectors. Specifically, the cost perceived by each agent,
traversing a link e ∈ E , is given by (3). The cost that an
agent expects to incur along a path p is
Jp(t, u) =
∑
e∈E
AepJe(t
p
e, u
e)
where tpe(t), when e ∈ p, is the time instant in which an
agent, arriving in t in the origin o and following the path
p, reaches νe. In particular tpe(t) = t when νe = o with
e ∈ p. Clearly, tpe depends on the controls uj for each link
j ∈ E that precedes the link e along p. Arbitrarily, we also
set tpe(t) = t when e /∈ p. We denote with
J(t, u) = {Jp(t, u) : p ∈ Γ}
the vector of costs on all the paths p ∈ Γ. Then, we assume
that the path preferences are updated at some rate η > 0,
according to a noisy best response dynamics
z˙(t) = η(F (β)(t, u) +Q(β)(t, u)− z(t)), z(0) = z0, (8)
which takes into accounts both the value of λ(t) and λ˙(t).
Generally in the literature (see e.g., [17], [18]) the throughput
λ is constant, hence in the formulation of the noisy best
response dynamics z˙ only the function F (β) appears. Here,
as λ varies over time, we need to introduce also the function
Q(β) so that z satisfies the constraint (6). In particular, for
every fixed noise parameter β > 0 the function
F (β) : [0, T ]× U → R|Γ|+
is the perturbed best response defined as follows:
F (β)(t, u) =
λ(t) exp(−β(J(t, u)))
1′ exp(−β(J(t, u))) , (9)
which provides an idealized description of the behavior of
agents whose decisions are based on inexact information
about the state of the network. Moreover it is continuous on
[0, T ] ∀u ∈ U fixed. The function Q(β) : [0, T ]×U → R|Γ|+
is defined as
Q(β)(t, u) =
λ˙(t) exp(−β(J(t, u)))
1′ exp(−β(J(t, u))) . (10)
We assume that (10) has the same structure of (9) and it
shows how the agents’ preferences z are updated taking into
account not only the value of λ(t) but also its time variation.
For this reason we consider λ˙(t) and we assign to it the same
weight of λ(t) selecting the same fixed noise parameter β.
We now describe the local decision function G : Sλ(t) →
R|E|+ characterizing the fractions of agents choosing each
outgoing link e when traversing a non destination node v. It
is given by
Ge(z) =

yze∑
j∈E:νj=νe
yzj
if
∑
j∈E:νj=νe
yzj > 0
1
|{j ∈ E : νj = νe}| if
∑
j∈E:νj=νe
yzj = 0 ,
(11)
for each outgoing link e in E and it is continuously differen-
tiable on Sλ(t). Equations (11) state that, at every node v ∈ V
the outflow is split proportionally to the flow vector yz , if
there is flow yz passing through node v, otherwise, the out-
flow is split uniformly among the immediately downstream
links.
Now, for every non-destination node v and outgoing link
e ∈ E conservation of mass implies that
ρ˙(t) = H(f(t), z(t)) , ρ(0) = ρ0 (12)
where H :
∏
e∈E [0, Ce]× Sλ → R|E| is defined as
He(f, z) := Ge(z)
(
λδ(o)νe +
∑
j:κj=νe
fj
)
−fe , ∀ e ∈ E , (13)
in which λ(t)δ(o)νe accounts for the exogenous inflow in the
origin node o and each component fe is
fe(t) = ρe(t)u
e(ρ)/`e, (14)
i.e., the flow on the link e estimated by an agent entering in
the very link at time t.
Next we introduce the hypotheses that we will use to prove
the existence of a MF equilibrium:
(H1) the throughput λ : [0, T ] → [0,+∞[ is C1([0, T ])
and bounded;
(H2) ρ(0) = 0;
(H3) ϕe : [0, ρmax] → [0,+∞[ are bounded, Lipschitz
continuous and do not depend on the state variable θe.
Note that ρ(0) = 0 in (H2) means that no one is around the
city at t = 0, while (H3) implies that all agents in the same
link at the same instant equally suffer the same congestion.
Remark 1: Note that (H1) (H3) also imply that the control
choice made by agents at the beginning of each link does not
change as long as the agent remains in the same link, and it
is constant in time. This is a feasible situation whenever the
movement of an agent on a link cannot be interfered by the
movements of agents that enter the same link after him. Note
also that the same hypotheses imply that is not convenient
to go back along a link e, which in turn implies that the
optimal control ue is always non-negative.
C. Value Functions
In order to define the MF equilibrium instead of cou-
pling the two standard MF equations, i.e., Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equations and mass conservation ones (12), with the
preferences equations (8) we write conditions equivalent in
terms of the value functions. An agent standing at νe, and
hence at θe = 0, for e ∈ {e4, e5} at time t has two possible
choices: either staying at νe indefinitely or moving to reach
κe = d exactly at time T (it is not optimal to reach d before
T and wait there for a positive time length, see, e.g., [7]).
Accordingly, the controls are
ue1 = 0, u
e
2 =
`e
T − t . (15)
Hence, given the cost functional (3), we derive
V e(t) = min
{
α`e,
1
2
(`e)
2
T − t
}
+
∫ T
t
ϕe ds (16)
(note that we do not display the argument ρe of ϕe for e ∈
{e4, e5}. We use this convention also for the other ϕe in the
formulas below). An agent standing at νe3 at time t ∈ [0, T ],
has two possible choices (meaning, the optimal behaviour
may only be one of the following two): staying in νe3 or
moving to reach κe3 at τ ∈]t, T ]. The controls among which
the agent chooses and the corresponding value function are
then, respectively
ue31 = 0, u
e3
2 =
`e3
τ − t , (17)
V e3(t) = min
{
α (`e3 + `e5) +
∫ T
t
ϕe3 ds, (18)
inf
τ∈]t,T ]
{
1
2
(`e3)
2
τ − t +
∫ τ
t
ϕe3 ds+ V
e5(τ)
}}
.
An agent standing at νe1 at time t may choose: staying in
νe1 or to reach κe1 at a certain τ ∈]t, T ]. Hence, the control
is chosen among
ue11 = 0, u
e1
2 =
`e1
τ − t . (19)
Consistently, one has
V e1(t) = min
{
αmin {`e1 + `e4 , `e1 + `e3 + `e5}+
∫ T
t
ϕe1 ds,
inf
τ∈]t,T ]
{
1
2
(`e1)
2
τ − t +
∫ τ
t
ϕe1 ds+min{V e3(τ), V e4(τ)}
}}
(20)
Analogous arguments hold for computing V e2(t) when an
agent is standing at νe2 , indeed in that case the controls are
ue21 = 0, u
e2
2 =
`e2
τ − t . (21)
Hence the value function is
V e2(t) = min
{
α(`e2 + `e5) +
∫ T
t
ϕe2 ds, (22)
inf
τ∈]t,T ]
{
1
2
(`e2)
2
τ − t +
∫ τ
t
ϕe2 ds+ V
e5(τ)}
}}
.
Finally,
V 0(t) = min{V e1(t), V e2(t)}. (23)
Note that, the optimal controls described in (17), (19),
(21) are detected along with the arrival time τ along the
minimization process carried on in (18), (20), (22). Also,
when ρ is given, the construction of the optimal controls
is performed backwardly, starting from the problem (16).
Finally, observe that V 0(t) in (23) is determined without the
necessity of computing any optimal control on the fictitious
link e0. We summarize the previous discussion as follows.
Theorem 1: Suppose that ρ is given and that (H1)–(H3)
hold. Then, every value function V e : [0, `e]× [0, T ]→ R, at
0 i.e, at the beginning of each link, for all e ∈ E and for all
t ∈ [0, T ], is determined through (16)-(22). In addition, V e is
Lipschitz continuous with respect to time, with its Lipschitz
constant independent of ρe.
Remark 2: Notice that, since the optimal controls are
necessarily equi-bounded by a constant depending only on
the parameters of the problem and since from (H1) follows
that the inflow λ(t)δ(o)νe is bounded and continuous, by results
on the mass conservation equations ((see, e.g., [19]), follow
that all ρe are Lipschitz continuous, with Lipschitz constant
L˜ depending only on the parameters of the problem.
III. EXISTENCE OF A MEAN FIELD EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we give a proof of the existence of a
MF equilibrium. Let L(w) be the Lipschitz constant of a
function w. As space to search for a fixed point, we choose
X =
{
w : [0, T ]→ [0, ρmax] : L(w) ≤ L˜, |w| ≤ ρmax
}5
,
(24)
the Cartesian product five times of the space of Lipschitzian
functions with Lipschitz constant not greater than L˜ and
overall bounded by ρmax, where L˜ is the constant introduced
in Remark 2. Note that X is convex and compact with respect
to the uniform topology.
Fixed the noisy parameter β > 0, we then search for a
fixed point of the multi-function ψ : X → X , with ρ 7→
ρ′ ∈ ψ(ρ) where ρ′ is obtained as follows: (i) ρ is inserted in
(16)–(22), the optimal control u is derived; (ii) u is inserted
in (8) and the path preference vector z is obtained; (iii) ρ′ is
derived from (12) after the computation of (11) and (14):
ρ u J(t, u) z H(f, z) ρ′
f
Remark 3: Note that in general ψ is not single valued,
that is ψ(ρ) is a nonsigleton subset of X . Indeed the
optimal control may not be unique as, for any fixed t, the
minimization procedure in (16)–(22) may return more than
one minimizer. In particular, in (16)–(22) this may happen
even along a whole time interval. Hence, when a multiplicity
situation occurs, ψ can be built in many ways, as many
as the different optimal behaviors. Indeed, for example, if
the controls in (19) are both optimal we get two different
flows fe1 and f
′
e1 (see (14)) and hence, through (12), two
different densities ρe1 and ρ
′
e1 of which we should consider
the convexification. Note that the controls’ multiplicity does
not influence the computation of z and hence G(z), but only
the flows f used in (12) to get the fixed point of ψ. To bound
the times at which such multiplicities appear, we will obtain
ψ and its fixed point ρ˜ through a limiting procedure.
Fixed β > 0, let {ψε}ε>0 be a sequence of functions approx-
imating ψ in a suitable sense, and ρε its corresponding fixed
points. The single function ψε is obtained through (i)–(iii)
above, with the difference that in (ii), rather than choosing
optimal controls, one chooses ε−optimal controls and, along
time, an ε−optimal stream. Accordingly the path preference
vector will be computed once the values of that ε−optimal
stream are given. We divide the construction into two steps.
Step 1: ε-optimal streams.
Definition 1: Assume for each link e = (νe, κe) ∈ E to
be in θe = 0, i.e., at node νe, and let uej , j ∈ {1, 2} be the
controls defined through (15) (17) (19) (21). Consider also
a partition τe = {tn}n of the interval [0, T ], and fix ε > 0.
Then ueε is an ε−optimal stream for the link e associated to
the partition τe if
ueε(s) = u
e
jn(s), s ∈ [tn, tn+1[
where uejn is optimal at t
n and ε-optimal at all s ∈]tn, tn+1[,
that is, it realizes the minimum cost up to an error not greater
than ε.
Notice that an ε-optimal stream associated to a general
partition τ may or may not exist, but it certainly does
when the partition is refined enough. Indeed, considering the
functions involved in the minimization process in (16), (18),
(20), (22), if the minimum is realized up to the error ε, the
minima are attained within intervals of type [t+ hε, T ], for
some suitable hε > 0, so that the functions cited above are
Lipschitz continuous. Denote by L the greater of Lipschitz
constants of these functions. Then a control uej optimal at
t remain ε-optimal at least along [t, t + ε/L[. In addition,
for every link e, there may exist more than one ε-partition,
as optimal controls determined in θe = 0 ,∀ e ∈ E , may
be multiple. Anyway, the number of ε-partitions is overall
bounded by a number Mε, as the optimal controls at every
θe = 0 are at most two. This argument proves the following.
Lemma 1: Fixed ε > 0, set N = max{n ∈ N : n <
(TL)/ε}+ 1. Consider the partition τε of [0, T ] such that:
(i) t0ε = 0; t
N
ε = T ;
(ii) tnε = nL/ε, for all n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}.
Then the set of ε-optimal streams associated to τε is
nonempty and finite.
Now, for a fixed ε > 0, consider the partition τε defined
in Lemma 1. Consider then the vector uε = {ueε : e ∈ E}
whose components are ε-optimal streams associated to τε in
θe = 0. As consequence of Lemma 1 the ε-optimal vectors
uε are a finite number of elements. Note that once uε is
fixed, all agents make the same decision, in time. Indeed,
given the value of the ε-stream on each subinterval of τε,
each agent, in that subinterval, can evaluates the total cost
that he expects to incur in each path p ∈ Γ and consequently
it will be possible to compute z through (8). Hereinafter,
we refer to this z as zε, since its value depends on uε. The
possibility for agents to split into fractions among different
vectors uε (that is, splitting among multiple optimal controls
on instants of τε), is given by an ε−split function µε so
defined.
Definition 2: Consider the partition τε. An ε-split function
is a vector µε = (µ
(e)
j : j = 1, 2, e ∈ E) ∈ L∞(0, T )2×|E|
whose components µ(e)j , called split fractions, are constant
on subintervals induced by τε and satisfy:
(i) µ
(e)
j (s) ≥ 0, for all s ∈ [0, T ], and µ(e)j (t) = 0 if uej is
not optimal at (0, t) for t ∈ τε;
(ii)
∑2
j=1 µ
(e)
j (s) = 1 for all s ∈ [0, T ].
We can see µ(e)j as the fraction of agents who choose the
control uej in the link e ∈ E .
Step 2: Construction of ψε(ρ).
Let β > 0, ε > 0 and ρ = (ρe1 , ρe2 , ρe3 , ρe4 , ρe5) ∈ X be
fixed. Let also τε be the partition of [0, T ] described above.
We now built the multifunction ψε(ρ) ⊆ X with compact
and convex images and closed graph, to which later we can
apply Kakutani fixed point theorem.
(a) We define ψ˜ε(ρ) ⊆ X as the finite set of vectors
ρ′ = (ρ′e1 , ρ
′
e2 , ρ
′
e3 , ρ
′
e4 , ρ
′
e5) ∈ X constructed in the follow-
ing way. We consider an ε−optimal vector uε, associated to
τε in θe = 0 for every e ∈ E . Then, we use uε to determine
the path preference vector zε. Finally, given the arrival flow
of agents λ(t)δ(0) and computed the flow f associated to
the initially given ρ and to uε (14), we solve (12) whose
solution is the total mass ρ′. We repeat the construction for
all possible (and finite, by Lemma 1) choices uε and call the
set of all outcomes ψ˜ε(ρ) which is a finite set.
(b) We define ψε(ρ) ⊆ X as follows. We consider an
arbitrary ε-split function µε and assume that at every point
of τε the outflow of agents fe from every link e gets split
in fractions µ(e)1 fe, µ
(e)
2 fe among the links e
′ immediately
downstream the link e. At the end of the process the output
is ρ′. We define ψε(ρ) as the set of all ρ′ generated by all
possible choices of the ε-split function µε. Clearly ψε(ρ) ⊃
ψ˜ε(ρ).
Lemma 2: The set ψε(ρ) is a non-empty convex and
compact subset of X , for any ρ ∈ X . Moreover, the map
ρ 7→ ψε(ρ) has closed graph and it has a fixed point ρε ∈ X .
Proof: We preliminarily observe that the set ψε(ρ)
is non-empty by construction. In addition, it is also closed
and, hence, it is compact since X is compact. Moreover,
it is possible to prove that ψε(ρ) is the convex hull of
ψ˜ε(ρ) which is the set of all ρ whose corresponding µε are
obtained through all possible ε−streams. Observe that the
set ψ˜ε(ρ) is finite and includes at most Mε elements. Hence
the set ψε(ρ) has a finite number of extremal points. This
fact, together with the regularity assumptions (H1) and (H3),
implies, reasoning as in [8] but taking into account z, that
the multifunction ρ 7→ ψε(ρ) has closed graph. Hence, by
the Kakutani theorem, there exists a fixed point ρε ∈ ψε(ρε).
Hereinafter, we denote by ρε a fixed point for ψε(ρ), i.e., a
total mass that satisfies ρε ∈ ψε(ρε).
Before stating the existence of a MF equilibrium, we intro-
duce the following definition that help restrict the equilibrium
concept to the purpose of our problem.
Definition 3: Let ψ and ψε be the functions described at
the beginning of Section III with β > 0 fixed.
• A ε-MF equilibrium is a total mass ρε ∈ X that satisfies
ρε ∈ ψε(ρε).
• A MF equilibrium is a total mass ρ ∈ X that satisfies
ρ ∈ ψ(ρ).
Note that ρ ∈ ψ(ρ) implies that ρ induces a set of optimal
controls as in (15), (17), (19), (21) used both to compute
the corresponding path preference vector z and to define the
fractions of flows according to a split function µ. Such a
function is given as in Definition 2 but with the difference
that µ is not linked to any ε-partition, and its components
are not necessarily piecewise constant. Finally, using (12) we
get again ρ.
Theorem 2: Assume (H1)–(H3). Then there exists a MF
equilibrium.
Proof: We proceed similarly to Theorem 2 of [8], but
with the suitable changes due to the presence of the agent’s
preference dynamics (8).
Remark 4: In the construction of the multi-function ψ we
have fixed a priori the noisy parameter β > 0. Hence, we
actually found a multi-function ψβ such that ρβ ∈ ψβ(ρβ).
Given the simple structure of (8) and (12) and to the prop-
erties of (9) and (10), it seem reasonable that for β → +∞
there exist a multi-function ψ¯ and the corresponding fixed
point ρ¯ such that limβ→+∞ ψβ = ψ¯ and limβ→+∞ ρβ = ρ¯.
The answer seem positive, however, we have not yet covered
all the details which we will pursue in future research.
IV. BI-LEVEL OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we discuss how the results introduced in
the previous sections can be used by a central authority (CA),
e.g., the city hall, interested in controlling the value of the
mass ρ. For any given input flow λ(t)δ(0), t ∈ [0, T ], heritage
CA may be consider sustainable for their historical centers
that mass of agents is closed to some reference value ρ˜.
Typically, a CA may slow down (and sometimes also speed
up) the agent flows by intervening on the width of the streets
with mobile barriers. Formally, we can assume that the CA
can consider congestion cost functions of the form
ϕe(ρe) = α
′
eρe(t) + α
′′
e ∀ e ∈ E ,
where (α′, α′′) are parameters in a compact K ∈ R5 × R5.
Then, the CA is interested in solving the bi-level problem:
inf
(α′,α′′)
(
sup
ρ
‖ρ− ρ˜‖∞
)
subject to inf
u(ρ)∈Uα′,α′′
Jˆ(t, u) (25)
with Jˆ(t, u) = {Je(t, ue) : e ∈ E} and where the CA
chooses the value of pair (α′, α′′) in the light of the expected
response of the agents. We claim that, if the set Uα′,α′′ is
a compact set of controls depending by (α′, α′′), then the
existence of a pair (α′, α′′)∗ solution of (25) can be proved
provided that a unique MFG equilibrium exists for each fixed
(α′, α′′) ∈ K.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper the existence of a mean-field equilibrium for
a traffic flow model is provided and a bi-level optimization
problem is formulated. In future research we plan to refine
the optimization problem from both a theoretical and an
applicative perspective, and to consider different objectives
of central authority. Moreover a comparison between our
MF model and the Wardrop one also through numerical
simulations will be provided. A further step could be to
consider a more general networks that includes oriented
cycles. For this kind of networks the backward approach used
for the resolution of equations (16)-(23) cannot immediately
applied.
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